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ABSTRACT 
  
A business must recognize and address various risk factors when establishing and maintaining 
its information system. The overall risk to management is that the control environment does not 
protect proprietary business data and the financial reporting system that produces financial 
statements and other information used by investors, creditors and regulatory agencies.  These 
risks require that management implement efforts to ensure the integrity and effectiveness of 
control procedures over business activities while being aware of additional system issues such as 
failing to adequately consider other risks which are more business-oriented including the risk of 
failing to prevent or detect fraudulent or illegal activities.  Worldwide in 2008 the value of 
economic data stolen was estimated to be a trillion dollars. After the public outcry from the 
business failures such as Enron there were efforts by the U.S. government, business community 
and the accounting profession  to strengthen business control environments to better address 
such  risk factors and thereby improving the quality of financial data.    One result of these 
efforts has been that businesses are guided by the features of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) and 
efforts by COSO (2007) which indirectly allude to but do not specifically address these risk 
factors in a technology-based business environment. Currently almost all records maintained by 
a business organization are now in an electronic format with over two-thirds never converted to 
hard copy. The integral nature of a networked system necessitates having adequate control 
aspects that ensure the confidentiality of business proprietary data and to ensure this data is not 
stolen or misused.  One aspect of this issue is that of insider hacking to transfer or misuse 
proprietary business data.  This issue and recommendations for management and their auditors 
are reported in this research.    
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2008 an estimated one trillion dollars was lost due to the theft of proprietary business data 
worldwide (McMillan, 2009).  Reacting to this potential loss (or fraud) a business must address 
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different risk considerations when it designs, implements and/or attempts to improve its control 
environment.  Two different internal views of risk must be utilized by the business as it reacts to 
the potential for loss due to theft of economic data or business proprietary data.  One view is that 
of business risk or the failure to maintain adequate managerial oversight and control over the 
day-to-day operations designed to assist the business in achieving stated goals and objectives 
(Internal Risk Level One).  A second view is the operational risk or the failure to establish 
procedures that ensure the day-to-day operations work effectively and efficiently (Internal Risk 
Level Two).   Operational risk is more in-depth (detailed) and includes the possible weaknesses 
and/or failures of the information system department tasked to provide a secure system for the 
business.  A secure system would include specific procedures which will either be system-driven 
tools and techniques or implemented manually by employees to prevent and/or detect the theft of 
proprietary data. 
 
Annually both internal business and operational views of risks are reviewed, utilized and 
evaluated by the business’ external auditors (EA) during the planning and completion of the 
annual audit of the financial statements so there is external consideration of the success and 
failure of the business in controlling these risk factors.  This external consideration is necessary 
since the results of the business’ financial reporting system and the related audit report are used 
by creditors, current and potential investors and regulatory agencies.  However, the EA’s (and 
the expanded accounting profession) view of risk is often overlooked by the information system 
(IS) staff as they focus on the internal detailed needs of the business system.  One result of 
overlooking the EA evaluation of the business’ risk exposure by the IS staff is a disconnection 
between IS operation and external expectation.  This disconnection should be kept to a minimum 
or eliminated if the business is to be successful in managing its risk factors.   
 
Risk Factors 
 
A useful starting point is to understand the end result a business desires from its control 
environment if it is to effectively implement controls that eliminate or minimize the theft of 
economic data.  Thus, we begin with the EA that provides direct assurance to creditors, investors 
and regulatory agencies that the results, financial statements, of the financial reporting system of 
the business consists of fairly presented financial information and indirect assurance that the 
client has an effective, well-managed system that reduces the likelihood of the theft of 
proprietary data and/or manipulation of business information.  The EA serves as the last check of 
reliability before business data is made available to the public, i.e., creditors, investors, 
regulators, etc., and serves to establish credibility about the fairness of presentation of the 
business data as presented in the financial statements.  
 
The EA focuses on the issue of risk from two principle perspectives:  1) internal to the client 
organization and 2) external from the view of the auditor.  These perspectives are attempts to 
simplify the evaluation of risk using descriptive methods and are designed to include updating 
risk perspectives for current changes in the global business environment including the increasing 
issue of theft of economic data.  Surveys have described the fact that more than 90% of all 
business records are currently maintained in some type of electronic format as well as estimating 
that 70% or more of these records are not ever converted to hard (printed) copy; thus, traditional 
descriptive efforts to evaluate (and thus manage) risk are showing signs of aging (Montague, 
2007).  Well-intended management efforts to demonstrate compliance with guidelines 
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established by Sarbanes-Oxley and COSO with controls including those addressing economic 
data theft as well as general business risk might still be unacceptable when an IS operations 
weakness could be exploited by an employee to circumvent IS procedures over the financial 
reporting system which allows management to investigate. 
 
External Risk 
 
The EA or certified public accountants (CPAs) engaged to audit financial statements prepared by 
a client’s financial reporting systems are required to assess the risk of material misstatement 
(RMM) describing a client’s internal risk (both inherent risk and control risk – discussed below).  
However, additional risk categories must be considered in order for the EA to develop a 
complete understanding and consideration of the entire spectrum of risk related to a specific 
business audit client - detection risk and audit risk. 
 
Detection Risk (DR).  The failure by the EA to detect and assess correctly the internal (to the 
corporation) risk factors and thereby not correctly assessing risk and thus being associated with 
misleading financial statements and an incorrect audit report with resulting issues raised by all 
external user groups.  An EA will attempt to manage his/her risk by considering two types of 
risk:  (1) tests of details risk (TD) or the risk that audit procedures did not detect material 
weaknesses in the client’s internal control system that underlies its financial reporting system, 
and (2) substantive analytical procedures risk (AP) or  the risk that audit procedures applied 
beyond those “test of details” procedures did not detect material weaknesses in the financial 
statements produced by the client’s financial reporting system.   
 
Audit Risk (AR).  The cumulative risk that an EA is associated with materially misstated 
financial statements by incorrectly assessing the various components of the EA’s risk during an 
audit and is a cumulative perspective of all risk factors (inherent, control and detection).  The 
AICPA describes a general model for understanding the general relationship of audit risk and the 
other risk components described above and thereby control overall risk of releasing a report 
associated with a set of financial statements by the use of numerical calculations  
 
• AR = RMM x DR 
• RMM =  Inherent Risk (IR) x Control Risk (CR) 
• DR =  Detection Risk 
 
The external auditor can manage (and thus control) DR during audit planning and the subsequent 
application of audit procedures (TD and AP) and are found in common audit practice guides 
used within the profession. (AICPA, 2007; AICPA, Internal Control, 2005) The rationale is 
simple, the auditors wish to reduce or restrict their legal exposure or liability to investors, 
employees and other stakeholder groups.  Evidence gathered by CPAs during the conduct of an 
audit of financial statements prepared (and thus subsequently published or distributed) in a 
client’s financial reporting system should also be examined from two other perspectives:  (1) the 
detection of fraud, and (2) the impact of technology on the financial reporting system and the 
related internal control system. In essence the external auditor will attempt to control his/her risk 
of being associated with a client (business) that also has risks.  The EA and the business attempts 
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to reduce or eliminate the potential for litigation claims that investors’ losses are the result of 
mismanagement.   
 
Internal Risk 
 
The risk that is internal to a corporation and thus the primary focus of the IS staff is the risk that efforts by 
corporate management will not result in an efficient and effective system of internal control and that 
internal monitoring will not reveal or detect control weaknesses and problems in a timely manner to assist 
the board of directors and management in achieving its financial reporting objective.  Risk management is 
how these efforts are commonly referred to and it as an area of consideration by corporate management and 
has evolved through the years as the failures of businesses have been made public and resulted in regulatory 
action and often the passage of statutory laws designed to improve the financial reporting process vital to 
investors, employees and other stakeholder groups (COSO, 2004).  
 
The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting established what became known as the 
Treadway Commission to address several issues including the IR issue as the accounting professional and 
the greater business community has undertaken efforts to address flaws and weaknesses in the financial 
reporting efforts by regulated public businesses.  In 1992 the Treadway Commission released Internal 
Control—Integrated Framework as a guide to the business community and thus, the accounting profession, 
as an effort to provide a structure for corporations to use in efforts to improve the existing financial 
reporting systems used.  This guide defined internal control as “a process, effected by an entity’s board of 
directors, management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
achievement of objectives” in three categories:   
• Effectiveness and efficiency of operations 
• Reliability of financial reporting 
• Compliance with applicable laws and regulations.  
 
The Commission stated success or failure of the internal control process is based upon a judgment of its 
effectiveness by the company’s board of directors and management efforts in achieving reasonable 
assurance that: 
• They understand the extent to which the entity’s operations objectives are being achieved. 
• Reliably published financial statements are being prepared. 
• They are in compliance with applicable laws and regulations (AICPA , 2005). 
 
A subsequent or follow up to the 1992 Treadway Commission effort was undertaken and 
completed by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO), subunit of the Treadway 
Commission, in 2001 led to the issuance an updated guide or framework known as Enterprise 
Risk Management Integrated Framework (COSO, 2004) incorporating evolving issues since 
1992 and several highly public financial reporting and business failures.  Congressional action 
resulted in the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (COSO, 2004).   
 
The updated framework was completed and circulated in 2004 and provided an updated structure 
for corporate management and board of directors in their efforts to evaluate and improve what 
was then being labeled Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) after a series of high-profile 
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business failures (and the corresponding audit failures by the accounting profession) that had led 
to investors, employees and other stakeholders suffering significant losses.  The goal of COSO 
was to provide an improved and more complete framework that incorporated changes in how 
business was conducted and was one of several attempts by the accounting profession to respond 
to the perceived failures of public accounting firms in the series of business failures and the 
enacted Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. In the 2004 guide Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) 
was defined as follows: 
 
Enterprise risk management is a process, effected by an entity’s board of 
directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across 
the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and 
management risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the achievement of entity objectives (COSO, 2004). 
 
These efforts have been integrated into changes in professional standards within the accounting 
profession as it relates to audit engagements.  The current professional standards promulgated by 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA, 2007) described internal risk in 
terms of two identifiable components:   (1) inherent risk (IR) – the susceptibility that an account 
or class of transactions contained within the financial statements or underlying records could be 
materially misstated, either individually or when aggregated with other misstatements, and (2) 
control risk (CR) – the susceptibility that an “inherent risk” misstatement could occur and not be 
prevented or detected by the internal control system (policies and procedures) established by the 
corporation (AICPA, 2007).  
 
These two components when considered together form what may be labeled “Risk of Material 
Misstatement” (RMM) – the professional assessment of both inherent and control risk when 
determining the planning, completion and conclusion of an audit engagement. However, RMM is 
only one aspect of the issues involved when professionals are associated with services that 
involve risk and describes the risks from the perspective of the corporation and not the 
accounting professional.  The CPA is not able to directly manage IR and thereby control it since 
it is a function of the inherent nature of an account (such as cash) and/or classes of transactions 
(such as Internet-based sales).  Equally important is that the CPA is not able to manage (and 
thereby control) CR since it is the result of decisions, policies, procedures and the resulting 
environment in which events and activities are recorded in the general ledger system and are the 
underlying documentation for summarized data in the financial statements created by the board 
of directors and management.  However, the CPA should be able to evaluate the adequacy of the 
client’s efforts to create a reasonable internal control environment that will address adequately 
the IR in their financial reporting system (AICPA, 2007). 
 
Fraud Detection 
 
The theft of economic (proprietary) data is a form of fraud.  The importance of fraud is viewed in 
the context of negligence.  Two degrees of negligence are important in understanding of it in 
relation to audit risk and fraud: ordinary negligence or the lack of reasonable care when 
performing services, and gross negligence or a lack of even minimum care when performing 
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services. The profession view is found in AICPA (2007) where fraud is defined and described as 
an:  
 
Intentional act by one or more individuals among management, those 
charged with governance, employees, or third parties, involving the use of 
deception to obtain an unjust or illegal advantage.  Two types of 
misstatements resulting from fraud are relevant to the auditor’s 
consideration in a financial statement audit:  misstatements arising from 
fraudulent financial reporting and misstatements arising from 
misappropriation of assets.  
 
In the AICPA (2007) the responsibility to be assumed by the auditor: 
 
Although the auditor has no responsibility to plan and perform the audit to 
detect immaterial misstatements, there is a distinction in the auditor’s 
response to detected misstatements depending on whether those 
misstatements are caused by error or fraud.  When the auditor encounters 
evidence of potential fraud, regardless of its materiality, the auditor should 
consider the implications for the integrity of management or employees 
and the possible effect on other aspects of the audit.  
 
The accounting profession attempts to use these definitions when assessing audit risk, 
determining DR (TD and AP) and determining the implications (effectiveness) of a client’s 
internal control system (IR and CR) which should be designed to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the achievement of objectives” as described by COSO in its 2004 framework: (1) 
effectiveness and efficiency of operations, (2) reliability of financial reporting, and (3) 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations (COSO, 2007).  
 
DISCOVERY OF ECONOMIC THEFT WITHIN AN INFORMATION SYSTEM 
 
The accounting professional has minimal guidance as to how auditors should gather evidence to 
form the basis for their report which will be issued with a client’s audited financial statements. 
Three common approaches utilized by CPAs and learned from experience by some of the 
researchers are: (1) auditing around  – the easiest and more common approach used within the 
profession is to compare known inputs with outputs generated by a client’s information system, 
(2) auditing through  – the more difficult approach for CPAs to use since it requires a level of in-
depth knowledge about information systems and technology that most CPAs do not possess nor 
do they have the technical expertise to obtain the level of understanding of technical (electronic) 
control procedures in place by the information system, and (3) auditing with computer aided 
tools or the practice of using computer technology to automate and/or simplify the audit process 
(Wikipedia, 2007).  The implications for the accounting profession to continue to select the more 
traditional approach (auditing around the computer) raises the question as to whether or not 
CPAs are adequately evaluating their audit risk (AR) and the detection risk (DR) component 
correctly during planning for a financial statement audit, and, thereby, actually increasing their 
exposure to claims of gross negligence and fraud. 
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Economic Theft via Circumvention & Fraud Risk  
 
In general one may assume that in today’s environment a business will use technology.  In fact, 
the level of usage is described by Montague (2007) as “90% of all records are now maintained in 
electronic format and 70% of those are never printed out in hard copy.”  One aspect of evidence 
gathering by the CPA during a financial statement audit is to gather evidence to form an opinion 
on the likelihood of Internal Risk Levels One and Two policies and procedures being 
circumvented by one or more individuals including individuals on the board of directors, 
executive management and/or other personnel.  The awareness of any circumvention efforts must 
be of interest to management and the CPA since the corporate environment of today includes a 
networked information technology (IT) professional unit that utilizes virus scanning tools, 
firewalls, network operating system features to manage the access to the company’s system.  
However, typically IS efforts are focused on the use of well-known tools or procedures such as 
matching user names to passwords and the use of firewalls to reduce the intrusions by hackers.   
 
Equally important to the internal efforts under COSO business guidelines is the ability of IS to 
know how to prevent and when necessary to detect errors or irregularities.  That ability and effort 
must be coordinated with the efforts of the external auditor.  In today’s network environment the 
EA has a level of an understanding of intrusion tools useful for those engaged in fraudulent 
activities as well as effective methods detect the misuse of these tools. The EA attempts to find 
the use of techniques and tools that can be used to circumvent existing security procedures in a 
computer-based information system and enable unauthorized access to individuals that may wish 
to obtain company information-data and/or cause malicious harm to the networked system. 
 
Economic Data Theft Caused by Employees in the Organization (Insiders) 
 
When hackers first try to hack into an organization’s networked system, they want to get access 
to an administrative account which would allow them to access any part of the system.  Barring 
this, they want to compromise an account on the system from which they will try to elevate their 
privileges.  An employee working for the organization usually already has an account on the 
system.  Depending upon their job in the organization, this may even be an administrative 
account.  Thus, if the employees are so inclined, they have an advantage over outside hackers—
they already have approved access accounts on the organization’s system.   
 
There have already been many instances of insiders attacking an organization’s information 
system.  Insiders are typically disgruntled workers and their motives are to hurt the organization 
(although some have profit motives).  The disgruntled workers may have been fired, laid off or 
may continue to be employed by the company.  For some reason, they are not happy with the 
organization.  They may be upset even if they think they are going to be laid off or fired.  It is up 
to security professionals and management to manage disgruntled workers.  Make sure the 
organization has an “…effective grievance procedure”  (Admin, 2007).  If an employee is 
complaining openly about something in the organization, management should know about this. 
 
They may want to steal corporate data or plant malicious software on the network.  Passwords 
for critical servers have been reset and were not given to the organization for days.  Logic bombs 
that could have wiped out data on 70 servers have been planted by disgruntled workers (Judi, 
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2008).  A contractor working at Fannie Mae is accused of planting a time bomb on its servers.  
“It was only by chance that (another administrator) scrolled down to the bottom of the legitimate 
script to discover the malicious script” (Lemos, 2009).  The malicious script was hidden in the 
legitimate script (Lemos, 2009).  This may have been avoided if Fannie Mae used a monitoring 
system that logged when files are modified (such as Open Source Tripwire ® (Sourceforge) ).  
Also, some organizations are “…implementing file integrity monitoring as a source of 
configuration control” (Tripwire, 2009). 
 
Passwords are often used to protect sensitive corporate data.  So it is especially important for the 
organization to make sure secure passwords all always used by employees.  If employees use 
secure easily cracked passwords, the login process can be easily changed to make the passwords 
more secure (Magruder, Lewis, & Burks, 2007).  If the organization offers public access to their 
web servers (such as may occur in an e-commerce environment), additional problems may occur.  
“Security issues and threats in the e-commerce environment are varied and can be caused 
intentionally and unintentionally by insiders and outsiders. Many experts believe that insiders 
create the majority of the security threats and issues” (Bidgoli, 2003). 
 
In a survey commissioned by Symantec in 2009, business organizations indicated they were 
worried that employees leaving the organization may take information from the organization that 
is confidential (Mills, 2009). 
 
The survey also found that many companies seem to be lax in 
protecting against data theft during layoffs.  Eighty–two per cent of 
the respondents said their employers did not perform an audit or 
review of documents before the employee headed out the door and 
24 per cent said they still had access to the corporate network after 
leaving the building  (Mills, 2009). 
 
 
It is critical that the organization audit its information system when a disgruntled worker is 
identified.   
 
Economic downturns may affect workers ethics, according to Michael Krigsman (2009).  In his 
article, “IT ethics and the recession”, he reports on a survey by Cyber-Ark of 600 workers.  The 
interviewed employees were from three countries, the Netherlands, US and UK.  “Once workers 
learn they may be targeted for downsizing, their ethics may erode.  Employers should be aware 
of this and enhance security accordingly” (Krigsman, 2009, p.4).  There are many ways an 
employee can harm an organization.  Lippert and  Swiercz (2007) argue “that a user’s 
willingness to share sensitive information on a voluntary basis”, on the Internet, “ is an area of 
concern.”  If an employee is not happy with the organization, will they become more or less 
willing to share sensitive information on the Internet about themselves or their company?  As 
their article indicates, more research about this “willingness” is necessary. 
 
Efforts to comply with current (and future) regulations/laws and to ensure the security of data are 
enhanced by log file management (Howarth, 2009).  Every computer has at least one log file.  
Desktop computer systems have a log file.  Servers have log files of users logging into their 
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company accounts.  They may also have logs for Web servers, database servers, etc.  Some 
systems have logs of individual user activity (a history of commands they executed).  Internal 
and external auditors, and security personnel must monitor these logs.   
 
One question is, “How much should employees be monitored?”  One answer is to monitor 
everything an employee does.  “RIM chief information officer Robin Bienfait, during an 
interview with ZDNet.com.au in Sidney, said that all actions carried out on RIM’s internal 
network were logged, which means that people who wanted to carry out private conversations 
might want to bring in personal devices…. When asked exactly whether it was conversations, 
rather than just written information she kept tabs on, Bienfait answered:  ‘Everything.  I record 
everything’ ” (Tindal, 2009).   
 
There are many types of malware that the company (management, internal and external auditors) 
must check for that can “leak” company data.  Although no port-knocking (Krzywinski, 2003; 
Magruder & Lewis, 2005) trojan programs have been found in the wild, code samples do exist 
(Mullins, 2009).   Steganography (Wikipedia, 2009) can also be used to hide company data that 
is being “leaked” to the outside.  Corporate espionage can be done by viruses written specifically 
for espionage (Magruder & Lewis, 1992).  There are so many ways for a disgruntled worker to 
get company data and use the network to get the data outside of the company.   
 
Understanding the potential existence of such tools and their usage is important to financial 
statement auditors and specialized auditors such as fraud examiners and forensic accountants 
who are engaged to determine the nature, level and implications of activities which are 
suspicious of being fraudulent including the inappropriate use of company assets-resources 
including economic data.  Numerous intrusion techniques (or tools) have been identified as tools 
for circumvention efforts.   
 
MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Several recommendations can be gleamed from the current research that are useful to 
management, IS personnel and the internal and external auditor functions.  Recommendations 
specific to management are presented here.  In Appendix 1 is a checklist that can be used by the 
internal and external audit functions and is cross-referenced within this list of recommendations.  
Garrison and Roderick (2006) also provide a checklist for non-security professionals who may 
not have a technical background. 
 
1. Educate users about password security.  Enforce secure password selections either 
through the system or a password generator.  This should be done as part of a new 
employees training and also repeated every quarter and when employees leave the 
organization.  Employees should be reminded not to let others use their organizational 
accounts.   
 
2. Develop a policy regarding employees whose behavior changes.  These employees may 
say things against the company to other employees.  Their immediate supervisors may 
notice this as well.  Develop a way for employees to let the organization know about 
unusual activity by other employees. 
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3. Develop a policy regarding employees that may be laid off or fired.  Either keep them off 
the organization’s system or monitor everything they do on the system. 
 
4. Use a check list of actions to be taken when an employee is laid off, fired or is 
disgruntled.  An example checklist is given in Appendix A. 
 
5. Develop a policy regarding “user-developed” programs.  Make sure the organization 
knows about these.   
 
6. Consider using programmable locks on doors to sensitive areas.  These are easily 
changed when an employee leaves the organization.  A system that records access is also 
important. 
 
7. Develop policies regarding taking work home; laptops, CDs, DVDs, memory sticks, etc.  
Minimize these actions.  This should be allowed only when really needed and the 
employee’s immediate supervisor must be advised of this and make a record as to what is 
being taken out of the organization. 
 
8. Periodically check all IT policies to make sure they are up-to-date and are being 
enforced. 
 
9. Have a specific email policy and monitor disgruntled workers email or discontinue their 
email privileges. 
 
10. Monitor disgruntled employees. 
 
11. Consider that a Distributed Denial of Service attack may be a cover for an attack.  It may 
be used to ”clog up” the logs to hide a disgruntled worker’s attempt to get back into the 
system.   
 
12. Check all logs periodically (volume determines how often) and especially after an 
employee has left the organization.  In Windows XP, the log is called “Event Log” and is 
viewed in the “Event Viewer” 
 
13. Use a log analyzer.  This will help the organization in finding any “leaking data” and help 
it to make sure no disgruntled workers are getting back into the system. 
14. Have the technology department check the company’s firewall settings to make sure they 
are up-to-date. 
15. Use a system that monitors files.  This also helps with compliance with federal laws. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
  
Several types of risk are considered by a business and its external auditor including the two 
traditional perspectives of internal and external to the company.   However, these risk factors 
continue to change due to changes in the global marketplace.  A disconnect between the external 
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auditor and the IS in-house staff is a concern.  Continual coordination and exchanging of 
information is necessary if a business and its external auditor are to effectively manage the risk 
related to the theft of economic data by employees.  Checklists are provided to help 
management, the internal auditor and external auditor to help to manage the risk of employees 
taking company data, exposing the company to legal issues, loss of “good will” and compliance 
issues. 
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Appendix A 
 
Checklist 
 
Internal Auditor 
 
 All passwords that the employee used or had access to are changed. 
 The employee’s computers on the company’s network have been isolated. 
 
 
     
   
 
   
 
   
  
   
 
 
 
   
 
     
    
The employee’s computer has been examined for  
 
 
unusual configurations, programs,  
 
backdoor programs, 
 
time/logic bombs,  
 
port-knocking programs (programs that can “leak” company information), 
 
steganography programs,  
 
malware, etc. 
Note anything found. 
 
 
 The employee’s server account have been isolated and examined. 
Note anything found. 
 
 
 Physical locks employee had access to have been changed. 
 Employee’s office and desk locks have been changed. 
 Scripts/programs the employee wrote or had access to or used have been examined. 
 Remote access for the employee has been removed. 
 Check computer logs 
  
 
     Server logs 
Note unusual activity: 
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 
     Web logs 
Note unusual activity: 
 
 
  
 
     Employee’s desktop logs 
Note unusual activity: 
 
 
 The employee’s name has been removed from all access lists. 
 The network has been checked for unauthorized account(s) the employee may have created 
(backdoor). 
 
 A log analyzer is in place and being used. 
 The firewall settings for the company’s network have been checked. 
 
 
External Auditor 
Checklist 
 
 A secure password policy is in place. 
 
 
 
Date: 
What was the date the last time a company 
computer account was compromised? 
 
 The company’s computer log files are 
checked periodically by the technology 
employees. 
 Check the company’s server log files. 
 The company has in place a “disgruntled 
worker” policy. 
 
 
Date: 
Date the last time the “disgruntled worker” 
policy was needed. 
 
 File monitoring is in place and the 
generated logs are checked. 
 Is there evidence that the Internal auditor 
consistently is using a checklist similar to 
the one given above? 
 
